Disclosures & Foreign Talent Recruitment Programs

What External Activities Should Be Disclosed to Federal Sponsors?

Each federal sponsor has their own (but similar) guidelines specifying which activities need to be disclosed prior to funding or during the period of performance to remain compliant with the award's terms and conditions.

For assistance in navigating those various requirements, use the resources below and ask your OCG Proposal Analyst for guidance:

ƹƵ & Education

Contact ocgcompliance@colorado.edu or your OCG Proposal Analystfor support.

What is a Foreign Government (Sponsored) Talent Recruitment Program?

According to the , a Foreign Government-Sponsored Talent Recruitment Program is defined as an "Effort organized, managed, or funded by a foreign government, or a foreign government instrumentality or entity, to recruit science and technology professionals or students (regardless of citizenship or national origin, or whether having a full-time or part-time position).

  • Some foreign government-sponsored talent recruitment programs operate with the intent to import or otherwise acquire from abroad, sometimes through illicit means, proprietary technology or software, unpublished data and methods, and intellectual property to further the military modernization goals and/or economic goals of a foreign government.
  • Many, but not all, programs aim to incentivize the targeted individual to relocate physically to the foreign state for the above purpose.
  • Some programs allow for or encourage continued employment at United States research facilities or receipt of Federal research funds while concurrently working at and/or receiving compensation from a foreign institution, and some direct participants not to disclose their participation to United States entities.
  • Compensation could take many forms including cash, research funding, complimentary foreign travel, honorific titles, career advancement opportunities, promised future compensation, or other types of remuneration or consideration, including in-kind compensation."

ƹƵ & Education

Contact cufso@colorado.edu for support.

What is an Insider Threat?

According to the NSPM-33 Implementation Guidance, an Insider Threat is defined as"the potential for an insider to use their authorized access or understanding of an organization to harm that organization. This harm can include malicious, complacent, or unintentional acts that negatively affect the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of the organization, its data, personnel, or facilities."

ƹƵ & Education

Contact cufso@colorado.edu for support.

Why Do We Screen Our Research Collaborators?

In order to ensure that the University of Colorado Boulder is compliant with United States Federal regulations (), OCG must screen individuals and organizations that are contributing to our research to ensure they are appropriately vetted prior to receiving funding. This includes verification of the Department of Commerce Lists (which include the Denied Persons List, Unverified List, and Entity List), Nonproliferation Sanctions, AECA Debarred List, and Specially Designated Nationals List.

How Do We Screen Our Research Collaborators?

OCG utilizes two tools to screen entities and individuals to ensure they are not debarred, suspended, or appear on Restricted and Denied Party lists.

Visual Compliance

The University of Colorado is licensed to use the services of Visual Compliance (https://www.visualcompliance.com) to ensure companies as well as individuals are not contained on mandatory Restricted and Denied Parties lists that are maintained by the United States Government and its allies, world organizations, and law enforcement agencies. These lists help prevent CU from having business dealings with parties deemed as blocked, restricted, or denied by Governments, world organizations and law enforcement bodies.

System for Award Management (SAM)

The System for Award Management (SAM) (https://www.sam.gov) is a United States Government-managed database that serves as the repository for all screened entities. This database can include both domestic and foreign entities. Furthermore, all businesses that are working with the Government must first register before they are able to receive a contract. While an individual must log in before making changes to an existing account or establishing a new record, the public can search the records without creating an account.

When Are Potential Collaborators Screened?

There are several checkpoints for screening potential collaborators. All sponsors in OCG's research administration database (InfoEd) are screened by Visual Compliance before they are added to they system to create a proposal record. During contract negotiation, SBIRs/STTRs and agreements with international entities are also screened through Visual Compliance. During subcontract negotiation, all domestic entities are screened through SAM and all international entities are screened through Visual Compliance. If a screening tool returns a match for a potential collaborator, a risk mitigation plan is discussed.

Contact ocgcompliance@colorado.edufor support.

What are the concerns regarding undue foreign influence in research?

According to JCORE:

"Over the past several years there has been increasing concern about potential malign foreign influence and research security risk at U.S. research institutions. These concerns encompass a variety of activities such as:

  • nondisclosure of foreign gifts to and contracts with U.S. academic institutions;
  • nondisclosure of employment affiliations and appointments with foreign entities
  • development of parallel (shadow) laboratories
  • recruitment of U.S. scientists to participate in foreign government-sponsored talent programs (FGTPs) that support the development of critical emerging technologies;
  • and theft of intellectual property and/or diversion of intellectual capital developed with U.S. government funds at U.S. research institutions.

While certain countries, including Russia, Iran, and others, have caused concern, the U.S. government’s primary focus has been on the People’s Republic of China (China), as illustrated by FBI Director Christopher Wray’s February 2018 address before the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee in which he stated that the academic sector was naïve to the China threat."

ƹƵ & Education

Contact cufso@colorado.edu for support.

Research Security Scenario

Assistant Professor Ellen Nguyen is an emerging expert in microelectronics. She has several active federal awards managed by CU Boulder’s Office of Contracts and Grants, including projects with NSF, DODand DOE. During the International Conference on Microelectronics, she was introduced to a professor who recently published an article on a new cooling technology. In their conversation they realize that they share mutual goals which results in a collaboration in which Dr. Nguyen receives equipment in-kind for which she can utilize in her laboratory for two years. Dr. Nguyen is thrilled, as the market value of this equipment is close to $50,000, and she did not originally plan for this purchase on her projects.

  1. Is Dr. Nguyen required to take any further action or reach out to any CU offices?
    Dr. Nguyen should first reach out to the Office of Contracts and Grants (OCG) as they are responsible for review, negotiation, and acceptance of a bailment (or loan) agreement. OCG will then be able to internally route to ensure other units may complete their review (and may include fiscal reporting (Campus Controller’s Office), Research Security, and Office of Export Controls). Dr. Nguyen should also plan to disclose this as part of her Disclosure of External Professional Activities (DEPA). In addition, here are some campus resources:
  2. While the equipment was provided in-kind, would this change if the item was gifted to her (rather than a loan)?
    Assistant Professor Nguyen will be required to disclose in-kind support. OCG is able to support her in making the appropriate disclosures.
  3. Are there any concerns in receiving this equipment in which she should be aware of?
    Depending on the nature of the equipment, Office of Information Technology may also review to ensure that the appropriate measures are taken. This will further ensure that the possibility of any security concerns have been mitigated.
    • See the CU System Office of Information Security’s
  4. Would the approach be altered if the professor is from a “higher risk” country (for example, Iran) and the equipment is provided from this country?
    As part of the internal review process, the Office of Export Controls will review the terms and condition, specifications of the equipment, and export control requirements. Any changes or updates to one’s DEPA shall also be made within 30 days of a change in a previously disclosed interest or activity or having something new to disclose. Depending on the nature of the agreement and requirements, additional measures may need to be taken (including incorporation of a technology control plan, export license or permit, etc).

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